State v. Morris Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39450 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-25-2012
State v. Morris Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39450
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Morris Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39450" (2012). Not Reported. 709.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/709
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 













BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 





Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
Morris Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused 
Its Discretion Or Violated His Constitutional Rights By 
Considering, At Sentencing, His Deceptive Polygraph 
Answers And Former Homelessness ................................................... .4 
A. Introduction ................................................................................ 4 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................... 6 
C. Morris Has Waived His Argument That His Deceptive 
Polygraph Answers Were Irrelevant And The Issue 
Cannot Be Reviewed For Fundamental Error ............................ 7 
D. Morris Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
Relied Upon His Former Homelessness In Deciding 
To Sentence Him To Prison ....................................................... 9 
E. Morris Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The 
District Court's Sentencing Discretion ...................................... 13 
1. Introduction .................................................................... 13 
2. The District Court's Sentences Are Not 
Excessive ...................................................................... 13 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 17 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Donald G. Morris appeals his sentences following his guilty pleas to fifteen 
counts of possession of sexually exploitative material. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
According to the presentence report ("PSI"), the Twin Falls Police Department 
submitted an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant for Morris which set out the 
relevant facts underlying his criminal convictions as follows: 
On 11/08/10, the TFPD received from Charles and Shelly Shoup a 
computer that once belonged to Donald Morris. Charles and Shelly Shoup 
gave consent to seize and search the computer. 
On 12/17/10, Officer Matthews of the TFPD received a computer and 
laptop from Forrest Andersen of Washington Street Pawn that once 
belonged to Donald Morris. Forrest Andersen gave consent to search the 
computer and laptop. It was determined through Leads Online and 
witness statements that Donald Morris owned the equipment. 
On 12/31/10, Officer Rudner met with Donald Morris at the TFPD, where 
Morris stated he had down loaded and possessed child pornography on 
the computers and laptop that were turned over to law enforcement by the 
Shoups and Mr. Andersen. 
The two computers and laptop were taken to IWRCFL in Boise, Idaho, for 
forensic imaging and search, and a Report of Examination was completed 
on 1/18/11 by FBI Special Agent Tim Kroupa. On 1/25/11, Officer Rudner 
reviewed the examination results found on the computers and laptop. 
Most of the images were child erotica and sexual exploitation of children, 
including, but not limited to images of nude pre pubescent and pubescent 
girls and boys, images of exposed naked breasts, buttocks and genital 
areas of pre pubescent and pubescent girls and boys, and images of pre 
pubescent and pubescent girls and boys engaged in sexual conduct with 
each other and adult males. 
(PSI, p.2.) 
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Morris was charged with 40 counts of possession of sexually exploitative material 
(R., pp.66-81), and subsequently pied guilty to the first 15 counts pursuant to a plea 
agreement whereby the remaining counts were dismissed (R., pp.97-108). After Morris 
failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, he was arrested on a bench warrant in 
Wyoming where he had been admitted into treatment in the Wyoming Behavioral 
Institute. (R., pp.117-130.) The district court sentenced Morris in three groups; counts 
1 through 5, counts 6 through 10, and counts 11 through 15. (R., pp.136, 140-156.) On 
each count, the court imposed a sentence of eight years with one year fixed, and 
ordered the sentences within each group to run concurrent, and the sentences of each 
group to run consecutive to the other groups - for a total unified sentence of 24 years 
with three years fixed. (Id.) Morris filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentences 
under I.C.R. 35 (R., pp.157-159), which was denied (R., pp.160-164). Morris filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.172-175.) 
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ISSUE 
Morris states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment in imposing a sentence of imprisonment instead of probation 
with community based treatment based upon its fundamental 
misunderstanding of the relevancy of the polygraph results and Mr. 
Morris's housing situation? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Morris failed to show the district court abused its discretion or violated his 




Morris Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion Or Violated His 
Constitutional Rights By Considering, At Sentencing, His Deceptive Polygraph Answers 
And Former Homelessness 
A. Introduction 
Morris argues for the first time on appeal that the district court abused its 
discretion and violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights 1 by improperly relying on two 
factors in determining he posed a risk to the community if placed on probation or in the 
retained jurisdiction ("rider") program, and sentencing him to prison. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.5-9; see generally Tr., pp.25-49.) 
Morris first contends the district court erred in considering his deceptive answers 
to two polygraph questions administered as part of his psychosexual evaluation.2 
1 Although the "issues" section of Morris's Appellant's Brief cites a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in regard to his claim that the district court improperly 
considered his polygraph answers, he merely alleges such consideration was 
"unconstitutional" (Appellant's Brief, p.5) and "a constitutional violation" (id. at 7). 
Inasmuch as Morris's contention that the district court improperly considered his 
"homelessness" alleges a violation of the "Fourteenth Amendment's right to 
fundamental fairness" (id. at 9), the state assumes the same constitutional basis applies 
to Morris's "deceptive polygraph answers" argument. The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment embodies the "fundamental fairness" standard. State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278 (2003). 
2 Morris took a polygraph examination in which he answered "no" to the following two 
questions he now claims were irrelevant in light of his admission during his 
psychosexual evaluation that "he had sexual contact with a girl his own age when he 
was approximately 18 years old" (Appellant's Brief, p.7): 
(1) "Have you ever had sexual contact with anyone under 18 years of 
age?" 
(2) "Regarding the issue of sexual contact with a minor, have you ever had 
sexual contact with anyone under 18 years of age?" 
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Morris's appellate counsel speculates that because Morris admitted having sexual 
contact with a girl his same age when he was "approximately" 18 years old, she may 
have been 17 at the time; therefore, he argues, his deceptive answers may have related 
merely to that typical experience, making the questions about sexual contact with 
persons under 18 "so obviously flawed that the polygraph results did not provide any 
relevant information, and reliance on the polygraph as a reason to order imprisonment 
was an abuse of discretion." (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) 
Because Morris did not object to the court's consideration of the polygraph 
results on any basis, much less relevance, the issue is waived unless it can be reviewed 
for fundamental error. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). However, 
Morris's contention that the district court erred in considering his deceptive polygraph 
(10/1/2011 Polygraph Report, p.3, attachment to PSI.) Morris's appellate excuse is not 
the only, or the best, explanation for why he registered deceptive when he denied 
having sexual contact with a minor. 
The polygraph examiner concluded: 
In the opinion of this examiner, Donald Morris's polygrams showed strong 
and consistent unresolved responses to the aforementioned relevant 
questions. 
Careful analysis and quantification of the polygrams revealed a total 
numerical score, which placed the results within the DECEPTIVE range of 
responses. 
A numerical scoring system in chart analysis was employed which 
contains a conclusion table requiring a high truthful or deceptive score be 
attained before a definite conclusion can be rendered. 
Donald showed significant reactions to questions dealing with sexual 
contact with anyone under 18 YOA, in this series of polygraph 
examinations. Donald did not corroborate the deception. 
(Id., p.4 (emphasis original).) 
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answers because the questions asked were allegedly irrelevant does not present a 
constitutional issue; therefore Morris cannot have it reviewed for fundamental error.3 
Perry. 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978; see Rules 402,403, I.R.E. 
Morris next argues that the district court "abused its discretion in determining that 
incarceration was necessary because [he] had been homeless for a time between his 
plea and sentencing." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Morris claims that "[r]equiring 
imprisonment because of [his] previous homelessness was not sound reasoning, was 
unconstitutional and requires vacation of the sentence." (Id., p.9.) Morris's argument is 
unfounded because the district court did not rely upon his former homelessness in 
deciding imprisonment was appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a timely objection, the 
appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental 
error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P .3d at 978. "Sentencing decisions are 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 
174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
3 Under Perry. fundamental error requires a showing that an error: 
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the 
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
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C. Morris Has Waived His Argument That His Deceptive Polygraph Answers Were 
Irrelevant And The Issue Cannot Be Reviewed For Fundamental Error 
Morris did not object to the district court's consideration of his deceptive 
polygraph answers at his sentencing hearing.4 (See generally Tr., pp.25-49.) Morris 
claims for the first time on appeal that the district court improperly considered that factor 
because it was irrelevant to determining whether he would pose a risk to the community 
if placed on probation or given a rider. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Because he did not 
object in the district court, Morris is precluded from presenting his "irrelevant polygraph 
questions" issue on appeal unless he can demonstrate fundamental error. Carlson, 134 
Idaho at 398, 3 P.3d at 76; Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961. However, in order to 
show fundamental error, Morris must allege a violation of a constitutionally protected 
right, but has failed to do so. Perry, 245 P.3d at 978 ("Idaho has limited appellate 
review of unobjected-to error to cases wherein the defendant has alleged the violation 
of a constitutionally protected right."). 
Although Morris ostensibly asserts a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the "issues" section of his brief (Appellant's Brief, p.5), he has provided no authority to 
support his underlying premise that the Fourteenth Amendment (or any other 
4 Morris cannot make a due process argument based on an assertion that he was not 
given the "opportunity to present favorable evidence, to examine all the materials and to 
explain or rebut adverse evidence." State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 854 P.2d 265 
(Ct. App. 1993); Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 788 P .2d 243 (Ct. App. 1990). At 
his sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that Morris's deceptive answers during 
his polygraph examination, as well as his homelessness, were some of the factors that 
increased his risk to reoffend. (Tr., p.34, L.5 - p.35, L.11.) However, Morris did not 
attempt to rebut the prosecutor's comments apart from pointing out that Morris was 
currently in a men's shelter and had a car. (Tr., p.41, Ls.8-14.) When the district court 
commented that Morris's deceptive polygraph answers made probation more of a risk 
and any future homelessness made probation problematic, Morris made no effort to 
correct, explain, or object to the court's remarks. (Tr., p.46, L.21 - p.48, L.16.) 
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constitutional provision) requires sentencing courts to consider only relevant evidence.5 
Therefore, he has waived this issue on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996); see I.AR. 35. Additionally, the requirement that only 
relevant information is admissible and the determination of whether evidence is relevant 
fall squarely under Rules 402 and 403 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, perhaps the two 
most quintessential "evidentiary" determinations routinely made by Idaho's courts. 
Despite Morris's attempt to characterize his "irrelevant polygraph questions" issue as a 
constitutional claim, relevance is solely an evidentiary matter which is not subject to 
review for fundamental error.6 Perry. 245 P.3d at 978. 
Inasmuch as Morris has not presented any federal constitutional law to support 
his argument (see Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9), he cannot meet his burden of showing the 
district court's consideration of his polygraph answers violated one or more of his 
unwaived constitutional rights. Perry. 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Therefore, 
Morris has waived the issue on appeal. 
5 Morris cites State v. Izaquirre, 145 Idaho 820, 186 P.3d 676 (Ct. App. 2008), for the 
principle that a sentence may be vacated where it "was based upon unsound 
reasoning." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) However, Izaquirre makes no mention of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, due process, fundamental fairness or any other federal 
constitutional provision or principle; it involves an excessive sentence issue based 
solely on state law. 
6 A defendant is, however, denied constitutional due process when the sentencing 
court relies upon information that is materially untrue or when the court makes 
materially false assumptions of fact. State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172, 997 P .2d 626, 
633 (Ct. App. 2000). However, Morris has not argued that he was not deceptive in his 
answers to the polygraph, only that his deceptive answers were given in response to 
irrelevant questions. (Appellant's Brief, p.7 ("Mr. Morris's answers of 'no' to these 
questions were deemed deceptive and may well have been so. But, the questions were 
irrelevant to the question of whether he had ever had illegal sexual contact with a 
minor.").) 
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D. Morris Has Failed To Show That The District Court Relied Upon His Former 
Homelessness In Deciding To Sentence Him To Prison 
Morris contends the district court's "decision to imprison [him] based upon his 
previous homelessness without consideration of alternatives violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment's right to fundamental fairness." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Contrary to 
Morris's claim, the district court did not sentence him to prison "based upon his previous 
homelessness." Although the district court correctly observed that homelessness would 
make probation more problematic, its decision to imprison Morris was based on several 
other factors. 
Just before announcing its decision to imprison Morris, the district court noted 
that Morris offered nothing to clarify why his answers to the polygrapher's questions 
were deceptive,7 and stated that such deception "coupled with what happened here, is a 
significant risk factor that I take into account." (Tr., p.47, Ls.1-6.) Regardless of 
whether Morris was being deceptive about having had sexual contact with the girl he 
mentioned during his psychosexual evaluation, vis-a-vis some other minor(s), the 
district court reasonably deemed his deception, in combination with the nature of his 
crimes, an appropriate factor to be considered at sentencing. The district court 
acknowledged the presentence report's observation that Morris has "routinely violated 
the rules of society over the past 20 years when it meets his needs" (Tr., p.47, Ls.17-
23), cited several other factors showing Morris was a risk to the community, and 
concluded imprisonment was appropriate, saying: 
7 Even after the district court noted that Morris failed to explain or clarify his deceptive 
polygraph answers, Morris made no attempt to do so until his unsupported explanation 
on appeal. (See Tr., p.46, L.21 - p.49, L.22.) 
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Mr. Morris, I feel that, based upon this type of behavior and the 
nature and conduct of yourself, your history as a multiple time felon, that 
probation certainly is not in the cards today, sir. In fact, I am going to 
order a sentence of imprisonment; and again, I do so because of the risk 
factors that I see here. 
(Tr., p.47, L.17 - p.48, L.6.) 
Given that the district court articulated several risk factors that did not include 
Morris's home-lessness just before declaring it was going to sentence Morris to prison 
"because of the risk factors," it can hardly be shown that the court's decision to imprison 
Morris was based on his prior homelessness. Even though the district court 
subsequently said that probation would be more problematic for someone who has not 
had a standard residence (Tr., p.48, Ls.6-9), that comment must be read in conjunction 
with the court's concern about the stability of Morris's living situation, expressed at the 
beginning of the sentencing hearing in the following colloquy: 
[THE COURT]: [Defense counsel], if I could ask a couple of 
questions based on what you have just provided me. One of them is the 
last paragraph of the therapy discharge plan. The, I think it's next to last 
sentence, says, quote: Donald was living in his car prior to hospitalization 
but now has housing with a roommate. The PSI, at page seven, 
references an address of 230 North Park Street. There's 227 North 
Jefferson listed as an address on the form. 
THE DEFENDANT: That, the 227 North Jefferson is my new 
address. 
THE COURT: So what's [sic] about living in a car? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's where I was staying at before I got my 
roommate. 
THE COURT: Where did this 230 North Park Street address come 
from? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's where I was living at, when I moved to 
Casper. That was the men's shelter, emergency shelter there. 
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(Tr., p.28, L.10 - p.29, L.5.) 
Having been informed at the outset of the sentencing hearing that Morris had, up 
until recently, been living in a men's shelter and also in his car, the district court 
explained to Morris at the end of the hearing that "probation would be difficult at best to 
accomplish with someone who's ... not had a standard residence." (Tr., p.48, Ls.6-9.) 
The district court was correct to point out that a defendant who does not have a stable 
residence would have difficulty succeeding on probation. The court did not say, 
however, that a defendant with past homelessness would not qualify for probation. 
Even if the court's statement is taken to mean that Morris's prior housing instability was 
a factor weighing against probation (vis-a-vis the successful completion of it), the record 
shows the court based its decision to imprison Morris mainly upon the risk factors it 
described just before it said it was ordering imprisonment. Morris has failed to show 
that the district court's decision to imprison him was based upon his prior homelessness 
instead of the factors it specifically outlined. 
Morris equates the district court's common sense observation that probation 
would be difficult without a residence to the situation in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 
660 (1983). (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) In Bearden, where the defendant's probation was 
revoked and he was imprisoned because of his failure to pay a fine and restitution, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay 
a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for 
the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to 
make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, 
the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to 
imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority. If the 
probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the 
resources to do so, the court must consider alternate measures of 
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punishment other than imprisonment. Only if alternate measures are not 
adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence may 
the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts 
to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional 
freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the 
fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
461 U.S. at 672-673. 
Morris's attempt to analogize Bearden to his case is not persuasive. In Bearden, 
probation ("conditional freedom") had been a viable option that was granted in the first 
instance and taken away through a probation revocation proceeding after Bearden 
failed to pay his fines and restitution despite possibly bona fide efforts to do so.8 In 
Morris's case, probation was never a viable option for valid reasons: being deceptive in 
his answers to polygraph questions, his 20-year history of violating laws, his record of 
multiple past felony convictions, the reprehensible nature of his conduct, and, although 
the court did not directly mention it, his previous failure to complete a felony probation. 
(Tr., p.45, Ls.2-12; p.47, L.17 - p.48, L.9; PSI, p.6.) Unlike the revocation at issue in 
Bearden, the district court in Morris's case did not decline to order probation based on 
his lack of resources. 
8 Bearden only requires courts to consider alternate measures of punishment other 
than imprisonment in revocation proceedings based upon a probationer's failure to pay 
a fine or restitution "despite bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so." 
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73 ("Only if alternate measures are not adequate to meet the 
State's interests in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer 
who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.") 
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E. Morris Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing 
Discretion 
1. Introduction 
To the extent Morris may be arguing that the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing an excessive sentence, his argument fails. Upon Morris's convictions for 
fifteen counts of possession of sexually exploitative material, the district court sentenced 
him to a total unified sentence of 24 years with three years fixed. (R., pp.136, 140-156.) 
The record reveals that the district court acted well within the bounds of its sentencing 
discretion. 
2. The District Court's Sentences Are Not Excessive 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To 
carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence of 
confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is 
necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any 
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given 
case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Though courts review the whole sentence on appeal, the presumption is that the fixed 
portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. 
Oliver. 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, 
the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds 
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might differ. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. "When a court has sufficient 
information at the time of sentencing to deny probation, its refusal to retain jurisdiction 
for further evaluation is not an abuse of discretion." State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 
230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 979, 
751 P.2d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
The district court specifically mentioned several factors that made Morris a risk to 
the community, 9 evidencing the court's "primary objective of protecting society" in 
sentencing Morris to a term of imprisonment. See Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d 
at 710. The district court agreed with the prosecutor's assessment that Morris's criminal 
conduct was "horrific" behavior because it "perpetuat[ed] the abuse done to the children 
that are being captured in this images .... " (Tr., p.45, Ls.2-12.) The court explained 
that "our legislature has found these to be crimes warranting the same punishment as a 
felony injury to a child, in Idaho a 10-year maximum, and it's, therefore, in my view, a 
very significant and serious violation of the law" (id.), and concluded: 
... [T]hese images and the perpetuation of them, in my view, are the 
kinds of things that perpetuate abuse of children, because they create a 
demand for this type of commodity. And so your conduct, while you 
weren't an on-hands [sic] abuser, certainly is such that you are one who is 
in the chain of that abuse. Idaho law recognizes that you need to be 
punished accordingly and that you need to provide DNA samples just as 
someone who is a hands-on abuser. And so I consider this type of crime, 
especially again with the history of time frame, and the nature of the extent 
of it, to be significant. 
9 As noted previously, the district court found the following risk factors: (1) his 
deceptive answers to the polygraph questions about whether he had ever had sexual 
contact with a person under 18, (2) the nature of Morris's crimes, (3) the "nature and 
conduct of [him]self," (4) his history as a multiple-time felon, and (5) his 20-year history 
of routinely violating the rules of society when it met his needs. (Tr., p.46, L.21 - p.48, 
L.6.) 
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I also have reviewed 19-2521 of the Idaho Code, which requires me 
to consider your history, the background, your risk, and amenability to 
treatment. I, too, am concerned about Mr. Nielson's report only from the 
standpoint that the polygraph has not been passed, and there are 
significant areas of deception regarding your prior history with minor 
victims yourself. There's been nothing to clarify that, nothing to say what 
went on or what is the reason for that significant showing of deception; but 
to me that, coupled with what happened here, is a significant risk factor 
that I take into account. . . . And for a judge like me considering cases of 
this magnitude, unresolved responses heighten the security risk that I 
think folks like you pose for our community. Whether that's a risk that 
requires long-term incarceration, I don't believe so; but I do believe that 
the risk, albeit Mr. Nielson says it's mild to moderate, I believe it's more, 
more significant. 
For that, I rely on, too, the statement at page 10 of the presentence 
report where they quote [the psychosexual evaluator] and say that Mr. 
Morrison [sic] recognized the need for intervention when in trouble but has 
also routinely violated the rules of society over the past 20 years when it 
meets his needs. Mr. Morris is amenable to treatment in a community-
based setting, however. 
Mr. Morris, I feel that, based upon this type of behavior and the 
nature and conduct of yourself, your history as a multiple time felon, that 
probation certainly is not in the cards today, sir. In fact, I am going to 
order a sentence of imprisonment; and again, I do so because of the risk 
factors that I see here. . . . You left Idaho and went to Wyoming under 
the guise of finding community education while these charges were 
pending. You were late, with an excuse for court. I understand and don't 
hold that against you. But I still consider all of these factors to be such 
that makes community supervision not an option I would choose in my 
discretion. 
The presentence investigator recommends a rider. I decline that as 
well, for the reason that I think you need a longer term look at your 
amenability to treatment, and that that can be best provided in a 
penitentiary setting. 
(Tr., p.46, L.4 - p.48, L.21.) 
Morris has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in its 
sentence. Morris had been downloading and viewing child pornography for over two 
years, he previously had two felony and eight misdemeanor convictions (see PSI, pp.3-
15 
6), he was deceptive in his answers to the polygraph questions about having sexual 
contact with minors under 18, and his prior felony probation was unsuccessful. With 
that background, Morris was not a good candidate for either probation or a rider. See 
Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 230, 832 P.2d at 1166. The nature of Morris's crimes, his 
criminal history, and his unsuitability for probation or a rider, show that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him, in sum, to three years fixed followed by 
21 years indeterminate. 
Given all of the information available to the district court when it imposed 
sentence, Morris has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, his sentences are excessive. Morris has failed to establish 
an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. The judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Morris's sentences. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 2012. 
' 
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